This paper is an attempt to show that my work to establish numerically flexible quantifiers for the syllogism can be aptly combined with the term logic advanced by Sommers, Englebretsen, and others.

I propose that reasons advanced in support of theism serve just as well, or can be modified to serve just as well, as reasons for believing that there exists a wholly evil supreme being. Accordingly, I suggest that attempts to justify theism are futile, since all would-be success is neutralized by the corresponding support that is thereby provided for antitheism.

The paper presents a numerical interpretation of the quantifiers of traditional categorical propositions and then offers a generalization to accommodate all other numerical values. Next, it considers the implications possible on the basis of both minimum and maximum existential presuppositions; and finally, it shows that every pair of categorical premises yields multiple conclusions when appropriate minimum and maximum presuppositions are made for the terms of the premises.

In this paper I challenge both the contemporary secular view that religious faith is not a virtue, and also the contemporary theistic view that religious faith is a virtue that is unavailable to nonbelievers. Although these views appear reasonable from the respective sides when faith is interpreted as belief, if faith is understood to be the entrusting of one’s ultimate concerns to whatever powers are in control (as I suggest), then such faith, with its accompanying ‘freedom from bondage’ (Spinoza), not (...) only appears to be a virtue in itself, but it also appears to be one that can be achieved by nonbelievers as well as by theists.This is not to claim, however, that theists should hold the nonbeliever’s faith to be as viable as their own (or vice versa); rather, it is to claim that there is no more reason for theists to hold that nonbelievers must be without faith than there is for them to hold that nonbelievers must be without hope or love.Still, of course, it may be that God does exist and that the belief that he exists is part of the formula for the realization of some ultimate religious concern, such as eternal life. (For example, it could have been that there was a person conducting a rescue mission for the mountain climbers, but who refused to bring those who did not believe so to final safety, even though they has boarded the platform.) So, if God does exist and if the formula for eternal life, for example, does include the requirement that creatures believe that he exists, then atheists and agnostics will certainly have erred by not embracing theism. But their error then (assuming their doubts not to be the products of such vices as pride or dishonesty) will have been an error in calculative judgment, rather than a failure in virtue: they will have erred by not having engaged a hypnotist—at least in last resort— to equip them with a precautionary theism. (shrink)

While accepting that distribution is a coherent notion, I argue that it is nevertheless irrelevant to the working of the syllogism. Instead, I propose: (i) that a term's being distributed or undistributed in a proposition is its capacity to be replaced in a truth-preserving substitution with a narrower or a wider term; (ii) that which capacity the term has is determined by whether it occurs as the predicate of a negative or of an affirmative statement of the proposition; and (iii) (...) that it is only the term's occurrence as the predicate of a negative or an affirmative statement–rather than its distribution value–that is relevant to syllogistic entailment. (shrink)